DCI MEETING WITH THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
GROUP FOR THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE   (MAGID)

8 June 1977

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9 JUN 1977

AGENDA

		TIME
INTRODUCTION		
Issue #1	Communications: Staff	(15 min)
Issue #2	Communications: Substantive Guidelines	(15 min)
Issue #3	Internal Coordination of Intelligence	(15 min)
Issue #4	Interagency Cooperation	(10 min)
General Discussion		(5 min)

Additional problems, not for discussion at this meeting,
are attached for your consideration.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE P/.9.L

Problem:

Our colleagues in the DDI are concerned about the gaps in communication --content, timeliness and dissemination--between employees and you and your staff. For example, two areas which have provoked much discussion and uncertainty are the upcoming reorganization of the Intelligence Community and the public tours of the building.

Recommendations:

--Make every attempt to inform Agency employees about programs and changes that would be of concern to them before they are announced in the press;

--Expand Notes from the Director or other Agency-wide notices to provide a forum for timely, forthright, factual accounts of initiatives, programs and options under consideration that may affect the future structure or direction of the Agency;

--Distribute Notes from the Director to every employee;

--Do not rely on staff meetings to communicate items of significance to every employee;

--Strengthen the role of DDCI or any other appropriate CIA officer, who will have the time which you lack in your role as DCI, to clarify and express your aims to Agency employees in your absence;

--Continue to use Management Advisory Groups (MAG) as a vehicle for two-way communication.

Pros	Cons
Reduce the rumor mill and improve morale;	Difficulty in explaining (substantively and not superficially) plans that have not yet been fully formulated;
Create an atmosphere more conducive to improving the intelligence product;	Place additional responsibilities on you and your staff.
Improve the longterm planning capabilities.	

Problem:

DDI analysts are having difficulty responding efficiently to your needs because of uncertainty over what you want and the formats your prefer or require.

Recommendations:

--Communicate better to analysts the reasons why briefing drafts are not used. The analysts can then send you updates on briefings that may be used later or publish elsewhere drafts that are rejected;

--Determine how analysts can provide you with necessary background data. You might consider taking substantive specialists with you to parts of some briefing sessions and holding periodic seminars with appropriate analysts;

--Establish a regular feedback system so analysts will know how their product is received when you brief and will be quickly informed of additional requests for information from consumers;

--Review the expenditure of resources that many of us commit to even the most casual request from your office to ensure that information is sent to you without undue formalization, time consumption, or coordination with intermediate level supervisors;

--Reform the process by which your requests are transmitted to working level analysts to ensure that they are not distorted by several levels of interpretation;

--Provide ready access to someone on your staff who will clarify your requests when necessary.

Pros	Cons
Use resources more efficiently;	Place more demands on your time and that of your staff;
Improved responses to your requirements and those of consumers;	May reduce intermediate level review.
Streamline flow of information.	

Problem:

There is a continuing problem of insufficient coordination in the production of intelligence both within the DDI and between DDI and DDO offices. There have been cases where the President's Daily Brief (PDB) has been altered at the early evening meeting of senior managers without coordination with the responsible analyst. There have also been cases where the DDO has submitted articles for publication in the PDB without consulting with the appropriate DDI office. In addition, informal office papers (those published routinely or in response to ad hoc requests) are often distributed outside the Agency without coordination, and we assume these papers are construed to represent official agency positions when, in fact, they do not. As a consequence, errors of substance or meaning have been discovered.

Recommendations:

--Coordinate last minute additional items and alter-
 ations to drafts for the PDB, except minor editorial
changes, with a representative from the appropriate
office;

--Fully coordinate all DDO contributions to current
intelligence products;

--Coordinate with all appropriate offices those
papers, including formal ones, that are submitted
to non-Agency consumers and that deal with topics
which are the responsibility of more than one office.

Pros	Cons
Minimize errors of fact or interpretation;	Increase production time.
Prevent overemphasis on single source reporting.	

Problem:

The Agency often has difficulty obtaining the cooperation of other USG departments and agencies. This is particularly true in receiving necessary inputs for conducting the analytic process.

The Agency seldom receives feedback on its products.

Recommendations:

--Solicit the cooperation of other departments and agencies in providing Agency analysts with access to their data; for example, data on US policies needed for intelligence analyses;

--Seek feedback on our products; for example, request those officials who use our biographic reports on foreign nationals to provide comments on their accuracy and suggestions for additional inclusions;

--Consider CIA policy of circulating to other departments and agencies a list of forthcoming publications. Request that those other departments and agencies reciprocate;

--Consider forming a centralized Office of Executive Liaison to coordinate interagency cooperation.

Pros	Cons
Better Intelligence product;	Requires more effort all around, which will
Better Interagency working relationships.	possibly detract from efficiency.

Problem:

The NIO system has fostered an increasing tendency
to view interagency intelligence reports and NIEs
as the primary method of dealing with controversial
issues. Those products are fully coordinated intelli-
gence and, as such, supposedly represent agreed community
positions; in reality, the end product is often of
little value to the policy maker. The judgments
contained in those reports are so compromised that
they are confusing and sometimes misleading. Each
agency's position is eroded during the coordination
process to the point that only a superficial assess-
ment of the issues in possible. Additionally, the
final product is likely to be an unbalanced, biased,
and possibly inaccurate presentation due to circum-
vention of the coordination process by some agencies.
For example, the military services and DIA often at
the last minute submit a "parallel text" that restates
their original position, including those portions
that were deleted during coordination. The other
agencies usually are unable to counter that tactic
without restating their own initial views. Consequently
they acquiesce.

Recommendation:

--Encourage more intelligence analysis and
production by CIA without coordination with
other agencies;

--Reduce the number of interagency intelligence
products;

--Use the NIO system to produce a community
product only when a coordinated view is determined
to be absolutely necessary;

--Prohibit parallel text containing dissenting
assessments after approval of the final draft
of an interagency paper.

Pros	Cons
Results in more concise yet detailed intelligence;	Forces the consumer to judge relative merits of individual agency analysis;

Clear identification of agency differences;	Could generate increased interagency rivalry.
Shortens production time and increases timeliness of the product.	

Problem:

      Not all employees are aware that you have offered
an open-ended invitation for them to send you questions
or issues they would like you to address.

Recommendation:

      --Reannounce the above policy in an issue of
Notes from the Director and in one of your
staff meetings.

Problem:

     The Suggestion Awards Committee lacks the exper-
tise and authority to make decisions on suggestions
forwarded by employees. It sometimes gives awards to
people for suggestions that should be considered integral
parts of their jobs.

Recommendations:

     --Give the Committee sufficient authority to act
on suggestions so that it does not serve only as
an intermediary between the "suggester" and the
component affected by the suggestion.

     --Eliminate the practice of awarding people for
suggestions that should be considered integral
parts of their jobs.

Problem:

In some work areas, smokers are having an adverse effect on the working abilities of nonsmokers.

Recommendation:

--Lend your support to the various MAG groups trying to find an equitable solution to this problem.

Problem:

Inefficient and inadequately trained management
often causes

-inefficient use of resources
-lack of coordination among resource, personnel,
and program planning
-lack of systematic management development program

Recommendations:

--Develop a systematic managerial development
program ensuring each individual is trained in
appropriate managerial skills before progressing to
the next managerial level;

--Expand the Directorate-level management intern
program to the Office and Group levels, giving
potential managers opportunities for additional
administrative experience;

--Consider a managerial career service, enabling
people to be evaluated and promoted on their
managerial skills.